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petition when a couple was legally married in one state, but currently reside in a state that does
not recognize same-sex marriage.8
While the Bankruptcy Code does not attempt to define marriage or “spouse,” DOMA did
attempt to do so. The Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”) section 3 had limited the definitions
of “marriage” and “spouse” to opposite-sex marriages and spouses.9 DOMA explicitly applies
only to federal law, but bankruptcy law is federal statutory law.10 Thus, for purposes of federal
law and the Bankruptcy Code, only opposite-sex couples could file a joint bankruptcy petition.11
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Windsor,12 which held that section 3 of
DOMA that defined marriage as excluding same-sex couples “[was] a deprivation of liberty
guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.” In so holding, the Windsor court
declared the definition of marriage and spouse under DOMA section 3 for purposes of federal
law was unconstitutional.13
Prior to Windsor, there had been a split of authority when interpreting whether same-sex
couples could file a joint bankruptcy petition.14 In In re Kandu,15 the Kandu court held that
DOMA as a whole was constitutional, which included DOMA’s definition of marriage and
spouse under section 3. In so holding, the Kandu court rejected the debtors’ Tenth Amendment,
due process and equal protection arguments challenging the constitutionality of DOMA as a
whole and under section 3.16 Consequently, since the couple did not meet DOMA’s definition of
“spouses,” they were not legally entitled to file a joint bankruptcy petition under section 302(a)

8

Id.
See 1 U.S.C § 7.
10
See 1 U.S.C § 7.
11
See 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N 2905, at 2906.
12
United States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675 (2013).
13
Id.
14
See In re Balas & Morales, 449 B.R. 567 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2011).
15
315 B.R. 123 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2004).
16
Id.
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of the Bankruptcy Code.17 However, in In re Balas & Morales,18 the court held that DOMA as a
whole was unconstitutional, including section 3 as applied to the debtors. In reaching its
decision, the Balas & Morales court reviewed the constitutionality of section 3 of DOMA, which
limited “spouse” to opposite-sex couples under strict scrutiny and held DOMA violated the
debtors’ equal protection rights.19 Since DOMA’s restrictive definition of spouse was
unconstitutional, the Balas & Morales court declared the same-sex debtors were “spouses” and
had satisfied every requirement to pursue their joint petition pursuant to section 302(a) of the
Bankruptcy Code.20
After the Windsor decision, the issue of whether a same-sex couple could file a joint
bankruptcy petition again presented itself. In In re Matson,21 a bankruptcy court in Wisconsin
permitted a same-sex couple who were legally married in another state to file a joint bankruptcy
petition even though Wisconsin did not recognize same-sex marriage.22 The Matson court
reached its decision by applying a choice of law analysis, instead of reviewing the
constitutionality of section 2 of DOMA, which provided “no state shall be required to give effect
to a same sex marriage performed in another state.”23 In applying such review, the Matson court
relied on “the place of celebration” rule, which states that a marriage is valid if it was valid
according to the law of the place where it was celebrated,24 and concluded that the court was
required to grant full faith and credit to the debtors’ legal marriage. Consequently, because the

17

Id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2012).
In re Balas & Morales, 449 B.R. 567 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2011).
19
Id.
20
Id. at 590; see also 11 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2012).
21
In re Matson, 509 B.R. 861 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2014).
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Id. at 863.
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debtors’ marriage was legally valid where celebrated, they were considered “spouses” under the
Bankruptcy Code and allowed to file their joint petition.25
This Article discusses whether a same-sex couple who were legally married in one state
may file a joint petition in another state that does not recognize same-sex marriages. Part I of this
Article examines the court split prior to the invalidation of section 3 of DOMA over whether
same-sex couples who were legally married are entitled to file joint petitions.26 Part II addresses
the Windsor decision, which invalidated section 3 of DOMA. Part III analyzes the holding in In
re Matson,27 which allowed a legally-married same-sex couple to file a joint bankruptcy petition
in a state that did not recognize same-sex marriage. Part IV discusses the implications of the
Matson decision for same-sex couples nationwide.
I. The Pre-Windsor Split
Prior to the Supreme Court’s holding in United States v. Windsor, which invalidated
section 3 of DOMA and its restrictive definition of spouse, there was a split of authority when
deciding if a same-sex couple could file a joint bankruptcy petition. 28 In In re Kandu, the court
held that same-sex couples did not meet the definition of “spouse” under DOMA, therefore, they
could not file a joint petition.29 However, in In re Balas & Morales, the court held that DOMA as
a whole, including section 3 was unconstitutional. Therefore, since DOMA and its definition of
spouse was unconstitutional, the same sex-spouses met all the requirements of the section 302(a)
of the Bankruptcy Code and could file a joint petition.30
A.

In re Kandu – Same Sex Couples Cannot File a Joint Petition

25

Id.
See United States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675, 2691 (2013).
27
In re Matson, 509 B.R. 861 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2014).
28
See In re Balas & Morales, 449 B.R. 567 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2011); but see In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123 (Bankr.
W.D. Wash. 2004).
29
Kandu, 315 B.R. at 131.
30
Balas & Morales, 449 B.R. at 590.
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In In re Kandu, a bankruptcy court in Washington decided that two women who were
married in British Columbia, Canada, could not file a joint bankruptcy petition because they
were not “spouses.”31 In Kandu, after filing a joint petition, the same-sex couple challenged the
constitutionality of DOMA generally.32 First, the debtors argued that DOMA infringed on
powers historically reserved to the state via the Tenth Amendment.33 Second, the debtors argued
that DOMA violated both due process and the equal protection guarantees provided by the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution.34 In so arguing, the debtors asserted that a same-sex couple’s
decision to marry was a fundamental right. Further, the debtors asserted that sexual orientation
was a suspect class.35
The Kandu court, however, was not persuaded by any of the debtors’ arguments. First, in
rejecting the Tenth Amendment claim, the Kandu court held that DOMA did not “overstep the
boundary between federal and state authority.”36 In particular, the Kandu court opined that The
Tenth Amendment was not implicated because DOMA was not binding on states, and therefore,
the court concluded that DOMA did not infringe on state sovereignty since states could still
define marriage without federal intervention.37 Next, turning to the due process claim, the Kandu
court held that same-sex marriage was not a fundamental right, therefore, DOMA did not violate
the debtors’ due process rights.38 Finally, the Kandu court rejected the debtors’ equal protection
argument, analyzing the constitutionality of DOMA under a rational basis review, instead of
analyzing using “strict scrutiny,” because the Kandu court determined that sexual orientation

31

Kandu, 315 B.R. at 131.
Kandu, 315 B.R. at 130.
33
Id. at 131.
34
In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123, 135 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2004).
35
Id. at 131.
36
Id. at 132.
37
Id.
38
Id. at 138.
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was not a “suspect class.”39 The Kandu court applying rational basis review concluded DOMA
passed constitutional muster without indicating the legitimate purpose the law serves.40
Therefore, because DOMA was constitutional, the definition of marriage and spouse could be
restricted to opposite-sex couples. Thus, for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code, a same-sex couple
would not be treated as spouses, therefore, they could not file a joint petition.
B.

In re Balas & Morales – Same-Sex Couples Can File Joint Petitions

In In re Balas & Morales, the court held that two debtors who were lawfully married in
California, and who filed a joint petition in a Bankruptcy court in California could pursue their
joint petition despite being a same-sex couple. After filing their joint petition, the United States
Trustee moved to dismiss their case.41 In particular, the trustee argued that there was “cause” to
dismiss because two men were not spouses under the Bankruptcy Code, because DOMA defined
“spouses” for the purposes of federal law as “a person of the opposite-sex who is a husband or
wife.”42 The debtors responded by arguing that “[they were] constitutionally indistinguishable
from opposite-gender married couples who enjoy the rights and responsibilities attendant to joint
bankruptcy petitions.”43 Responding to the debtors’ constitutional arguments, the United States
Trustee asserted that DOMA survived rational basis review because it served numerous
legitimate governmental interests, such as encouraging responsible procreation, childbearing, and
defending and nurturing the traditional heterosexual marriage.44 The Balas & Morales court,
however, rejected those justifications.45

39

Id.
In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123, 132 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2004). (“If participation in same-sex marriage is not a
fundamental right, the court must address the constitutionality of DOMA with a more liberal rational basis analysis
that requires upholding the legislation if it is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest.”).
41
See In re Balas & Morales, 449 B.R. 567, 570 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2011); see also 11. US.C. § 1307(c) (2012).
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id. at 578.
45
Id.
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The Balas & Morales court applied heightened scrutiny to address the constitutionality of
DOMA. Consequently, after reviewing DOMA with heightened scrutiny, the court concluded
that DOMA’s definition of “spouse” violated the couple’s equal protection rights.46 Further, the
Balas & Morales court concluded that DOMA would even fail rational basis review.47 The Balas
& Morales court stated that the various justifications for DOMA such as procreation, child
bearing, and defining and nurturing the traditional heterosexual marriage were irrelevant to filing
a joint petition. The Balas & Morales court stated, a same-sex couples joint petition would have
no effect on procreation or child-bearing, and a joint petition in no way would harm any
marriage of heterosexual persons.48 Therefore, even under rational basis, there was no valid
reason for DOMA’s definition of spouse and marriage as applied to the debtors.49
Accordingly, because the Balas & Morales court held DOMA’s definition of “spouse”
was unconstitutional, the court concluded that the debtors were spouses for purposes of section
302(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. Therefore, the Balas & Morales court denied the United States
Trustee’s motion to dismiss the case and permitted the debtors to pursue their joint petition.
II. Windsor – Section 3 of DOMA is Unconstitutional

46

In re Balas & Morales, 449 B.R. 567, 578 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2011).
The court set forth a four-factor test to determine what class of constitutional
scrutiny should apply to sexual orientation. The court stated that a class is
deserving of heightened scrutiny if the following has been met: (1) whether the
group has faced a history of discrimination; (2) whether the class has defining
and immutable characteristics; (3) whether the group is powerless in the political
process; and (4) whether sexual orientation is irrelevant to an individual’s ability
to contribute to society. Accordingly, the court held: (1) the debtors have
demonstrated through additional authoritative case law that lesbians and gay
men have experienced a history of discrimination; (2) that sexual orientation is a
“defining” and immutable characteristic; (3) that lesbians and gay men face
significant political obstacles; and (4) that gays and lesbians have made
important contributions to society.
Id.
47
Id. at 579 (“The Debtors have demonstrated that DOMA violates their equal protection rights afforded under the
Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, under heightened scrutiny or under rational basis review.”).
48
Id.
49
Id.
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In United States v. Windsor, the Supreme Court held that section 3 of DOMA, which
restricted the definition of marriage as “one only between a man and a woman” was
unconstitutional.50 In Windsor, a same-sex spouse who was legally married was denied the
benefit of the spousal estate tax deduction, because under section 3 of DOMA the definition of
“marriage” excluded same-sex couples and “spouse” only included a husband and wife who
were of the opposite-sex.51 There, the plaintiff and the decedent had been married in Canada and
were domiciled in New York, which recognized their marriage as legally valid.52 Because the
plaintiff was married to a same-sex spouse, she did not meet DOMA’s requirement under the
definition of “marriage” and “spouse” and was not entitled to any federal estate tax deductions.
The plaintiff argued that section 3 of DOMA was unconstitutional as applied to her because it
violated her equal protection rights and singled out her legally valid marriage.53
The Supreme Court accepted the plaintiff’s argument, and held that section 3 of DOMA
was unconstitutional because it “violate[d] basic due process and equal protection principles
applicable to the federal government.”54 Specifically, the Windsor court determined that DOMA
singled out specific unions, such as those between same-sex couples solely in an attempt to
discriminate. Further, the Windsor court stated the section 3 was invalid because “no legitimate
purpose overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage and to injure those whom the State, by its
marriage laws, sought to protect.”55
As a result of Windsor, legally married same-sex couples are “spouses” for the purposes
of federal law. Nonetheless, the Windsor court did not address the constitutionality of section 2

50

United States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013).
In re Matson, 509 B.R. 861, 862 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2014).
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
United States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013).
55
Id.
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of DOMA,56 which carves out an exception to the Full Faith and Credit Act, stating that “no state
shall be required to give any effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding respecting a
relationship between persons of the same sex.”57 Consequently, the Windsor courts holding
effectively resolved the split over whether same-sex couples are barred from filing a joint
petition due to the invalidation of section 3 of DOMA. However, since the Windsor court’s
holding did not address whether a state that does not permit same-sex marriages must recognize
a same-sex marriage conducted in a state that permits such marriages, the issue of whether a
same-sex couple that was legally married in one state, but resided in a state that does not
recognize the marriage remained open, because the Bankruptcy Code does not indicate which
state’s law applies when determining whether a same-sex couple are spouses for the purposes of
section 302(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.
III. In re Matson – Same Sex Couple Deemed “Spouses” For Purposes of The Bankruptcy
Code
In In re Matson, a Bankruptcy court in Wisconsin held that same-sex couples were
“spouses” for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code.58 In so holding, the Matson court needed to
determine whether the debtors, who were legally married in Iowa, a state that recognized samesex marriage as valid, and resided in Wisconsin, a state that did not recognize their marriage,
were “spouses” for purposes of section 302(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. Unlike Windsor, the
parties in this case were not married in Wisconsin, nor were they living in a state that recognized
and protected same-sex marriage.59 Nonetheless, after the couple filed their joint petition, the
creditor moved to dismiss the debtors’ case. In so arguing, the creditor cited that a joint petition

56

In re Matson, 509 B.R. 861, 862 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2014).
28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2012).
58
Matson, 509 B.R. at 861.
59
Id. (stating under the narrow ruling in Windsor, those individuals married in a jurisdiction recognizing same-sex
marriage and currently living in a state that recognizes same-sex marriage are entitled to have their marriage
federally recognized).
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may only be commenced “by an individual that may be a debtor under such chapter and such
individual’s spouse,”60 the creditor also noted that traditionally “the definition and regulation of
marriage … has been treated as being within authority and realm of the separate States[.]”61
Therefore, the creditor argued that, since Wisconsin does not allow or recognize same-sex
marriages,62 the debtors were not “spouses” for purposes of section 302(a) of the Bankruptcy
Code.63 In response, the debtors relied on Supreme Court’s holding in Windsor, which stated that
section 3 of DOMA and its definition of spouse “violate[d] basic due process and equal
protection principles applicable to the Federal Government.”64 Further, the debtors claimed the
state of Wisconsin “does not have any authority to deny a lawfully wedded couple any federal
benefits, which would include the right to file as spouses in a joint bankruptcy case.”65
In response, the court stated that Wisconsin was not required to recognize same-sex
marriages, which is a stance currently allowable under section 2 of DOMA,66 however, section 2
applies to states, but it does not apply to Federal courts. Therefore, the court determined the right
of same-sex spouses, married in a state that allows them to do so, to file a joint bankruptcy case
in a state that does not recognize their union as a marriage requires a choice of laws analysis.67
A.

Choice of Laws – Place of Celebration Governs Validity of Marriage

Specifically, the Matson court stated, the Bankruptcy Code is silent as to which state law
applies when determining the validity of a marriage.68 The Matson court opined, that “it is well
established that the law of the place where the marriage is celebrated governs the validity of the

60

United States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675, 2689 (2013).; see also 11 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2012) (emphasis added).
Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675, at 2689—90
62
Wis. Const. art. XII, § 13.
63
In re Matson, 509 B.R. 860, 861 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2014).
64
United States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct., 2675, 2693 (2013).
65
Matson, 509 B.R. at 861.
66
Id at 863.
67
Id.
68
Id.
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marriage.”69 Further, the Matson court stated, “it is the majority view and the historical view that
the law of the place of celebration governs the capacity of parties to marry.”70 The general
concept of “lex celebrationis” means that a marriage is valid if it was valid according to the law
of the place where it is celebrated.71 The Matson court believed this rule made practical sense
and stated, “[t]his rule guarantees that a married couple will not lose their marital status because
they travel or move their domicile from state-to-state.”72 Therefore, as applied to same-sex
couples, the Matson court held that the law of where the couple was married governs, not the law
of the couple’s domicile.73
B.

Full Faith and Credit Requires Recognition of Legally Valid Marriages

Further, the court stated, although a state is not required to recognize the debtors’
marriage if their constitution and laws do not, they are still bound by the Full Faith and Credit
Act.74 Thus, under the Full Faith and Credit Act for purposes of federal law a state that does not
recognize same-sex marriage must recognize and apply the laws of the state where the marriage
was celebrated. So, if a same-sex couple’s marriage was legally valid where the marriage was
originally performed, it will be deemed valid in another state.75 Here, the Wisconsin court was
required to apply Iowa’s same-sex marriage law for purposes of federal law.76 Further, because
the debtors’ marriage was lawful where originally performed, and since Windsor77 invalidated
DOMA’s requirement that the word “spouse” referred to only opposite-sex couples, same-sex

69

Id. at 862.
Effect in Third State of Marriage Where Celeberated But Void By Law of Domicil of Parties 51 A.L.R. 1412
(1927) (meaning that the place of celebration also governs whether same-sex couples can enter into a valid
marriage).
71
In re Matson, 509 B.R. 860, 863 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2014).
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
See id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2012).
75
Matson, 509 B.R. at 863.
76
Id.
77
See Generally United States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675 (2013).
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couples will be considered spouses for purposes of federal law and the Bankruptcy Code.
Accordingly, the court held that same-sex couples will fulfill the Code’s requirement that, “a
joint bankruptcy petition may only be filed by an individual and the individual’s spouse.”78
IV. Implications of In re Matson
In re Matson was significant because it allows same-sex couples who were legally
married in one state to file joint bankruptcy petitions regardless of where they live. This is
important because a same-sex couple who was legally married will not be deprived of their
marital status if they relocate to another state. A couple’s right to file a joint bankruptcy petition
has many practical benefits. Allowing a couple to file a joint petition not only makes practical
sense for the couple, but also promotes both judicial economy and consistency. The practical
benefits of a joint petition include ensuring that one judge will hear the couple’s case, which
provides consistent decisions. Further, judicial economy is promoted by organizing, and if
necessary liquidating the couple’s assets without requiring judicial oversight by multiple courts.
Further, a joint petition allows a couple who is already short on money to obtain one lawyer,
rather than spend money on two lawyers. So, by extending this right not only to “traditional”
couples, but also to same-sex couples will immediately improve the efficiency of bankruptcy
proceedings. After Matson, it is likely that more same-sex couples will be able to file joint
petitions. Moreover, it will be less likely that same-sex couples’ joint petitions are dismissed, or
in the alternative bifurcated. This provides stability to same-sex couples around the country
knowing that they can organize and liquidate their assets with their spouse and enjoy the same
rights as opposite-sex couples under The Bankruptcy Code.

78

See 11 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2012).
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Soon the Supreme Court will decide whether same-sex marriage should be recognized on
both the State and Federal level. This comes at a time where a decision from the Supreme Court
is necessary. A ruling would ensure both consistency amongst the circuits, and provide same-sex
couples with the same rights as traditional couples. Whether it is the right to joint filing, or any
other right provided to opposite-sex marriages, it is evident that the Supreme Court needs to
address the issue of whether a state is required to recognize a marriage between two people of
the same-sex when their marriage was lawfully licensed and performed out-of-state.
Conclusion
The issue in In re Matson required the Matson court to determine whether a same-sex
couple who were legally married in one state, but submitted a joint petition in a state that did not
recognize same sex-marriage would still have a right to file a joint bankruptcy petition. After
Windsor invalidated section 3 of DOMA, which restricted marriage to only those of oppositesex, a decision on whether same-sex couple’s could petition jointly under section 302(a) of the
Bankruptcy Code was imminent. However, the Bankruptcy Code was silent as to which state law
applied in determining the validity of a marriage. The Matson court relied on the “place of
celebration” rule, which states if a couple is legally married in one state, they will be deemed
married for purposes of federal law and the Bankruptcy Code. Further, under the Full Faith and
Credit Act, a state that does not recognize same-sex marriages must recognize a same-sex
marriage if it was valid where performed. Therefore, a same sex couple could file a joint petition
in any state they reside in if they were legally married in another state. In so holding, the Matson
court ensured that same-sex couples would be treated the same as “traditional” couples for
purposes of the Bankruptcy Code, which included their right to file a joint bankruptcy petition.
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